The first on-line/off-line signature scheme introduced by Even et al. in 1990 has two problems: (a) impractical signature length and (b) a one-time use of signature generated during the off-line phase. In 2001, Shamir and Tauman significantly shortened the length of the signature by using trapdoor hash families introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin in 2000. However, each trapdoor hash value and its signature in the off-line phase of Shamir and Tauman's signature scheme can be used for signing only one message in the on-line phase. In this paper, we propose multiple-collision trapdoor hash families based on discrete logarithm and factoring assumptions, and provide formal proofs of their security. We also introduce an efficient on-line/off-line signature scheme based on our proposed trapdoor hash families. Our on-line/off-line signature scheme can re-use a trapdoor hash value for signing multiple messages. If a signer includes this trapdoor hash value in the public-key digital certificate, there is no need to have any regular digital signature scheme to sign the trapdoor hash value in the off-line phase.
INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Even et al. [1] introduced the first on-line/offline signature scheme in which the signing of a message is accomplished in two phases, namely, off-line and on-line. In their scheme, a signer performs moderate off-line computation and performs fast on-line computation when a message is ready. The on-line/off-line signature is very useful for applications such as smart cards and mobile devices in which on-line resources are limited. Nonetheless, there are a few drawbacks in the scheme of Even et al. First, the length of the signature in their scheme is not practical as it is increased by a quadratic factor with the length of the message [1, 2] . Second, a signature generated in the off-line phase can be used for no more than one message in the on-line phase (the so-called one-time signature will be defined later in Section 4.2). In 2001, Shamir and Tauman [2] proposed an improved on-line/off-line signature scheme based on (a) trapdoor hash families introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [3] and (b) a regular digital signature algorithm, to significantly shorten the length of the signature. Krawczyk and Rabin [3] used trapdoor hash families to construct a chameleon signature, which is a signature verifiable only by an intended party and not by any other party. However, the trapdoor hash value and its signature in the off-line phase in Shamir and Tauman's signature scheme can only be used for one message in the on-line phase, as multiple uses of the same trapdoor hash value in different messages will lead to the disclosure of the secret key. We call this type of trapdoor hash families one-time collision trapdoor hash families. Chen et al. [4, 5] proposed a special double-trapdoor hash family to overcome the above problem. Their scheme is based on the elliptic curve for implementation. They have claimed that their Efficient On-line/Off-line Signature Schemes 1479 scheme is optimal with regard to the length of the signature. The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was suggested independently by Koblitz [6] and Miller [7] in 1985. It was commonly believed that a group with fewer elements can be used to obtain the same level of security as RSA-based systems. Based on this assumption, the key length of elliptic curve-based cryptographic algorithms can be much smaller than the key length of most RSA or discrete logarithm (DL)-based cryptographic algorithms. However, no mathematical proof of this assumption for elliptic curve-based cryptosystem has been published so far. Catalano et al. [8] unified Even et al.'s paradigm based on one-time signatures and ShamirTauman paradigm based on trapdoor hash functions, in the sense that they both use an ordinary signature scheme and a (weak) one-time signature scheme as components. Recent works in on-line/off-line signatures have been done in improving the efficiency [9] , eliminating the random oracle model [10] , constructing ID-based on-line/off-line signature schemes [11] , constructing on-line/off-line threshold signature schemes [12, 13] , avoiding key exposure [4] and avoiding trapdoor hash primitives [14] .
In this paper, we propose multiple-collision trapdoor hash families based on DL and factoring assumptions. In multiplecollision trapdoor hash families, revealing multiple collisions of the same hash value will not leak the secret key of trapdoor functions. Our multiple-collision trapdoor hash families are similar to the ElGamal signature scheme [15] in which a pair of long-term and one-time private keys is used for generating an ElGamal digital signature. Based on our proposed trapdoor hash families, we introduce an efficient on-line/off-line signature scheme which can significantly improve the efficiency of the Shamir and Tauman's on-line/off-line signature. Specifically, in our signature scheme, a trapdoor hash value can be re-used for signing multiple messages. If a signer includes this trapdoor hash value in the public-key digital certificate, there is no need to sign the hash value in the off-line phase. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the trapdoor hash families. Section 3 describes our proposed trapdoor hash families. Section 4 reviews Shamir and Tauman's on-line/off-line signature scheme. Section 5 describes our on-line/off-line signature schemes. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
REVIEW OF TRAPDOOR HASH FAMILIES
A trapdoor hash family was introduced in [3] and formally defined in [2] . For reviewing purpose, we describe the definition in the following. For a comprehensive study on trapdoor related schemes, readers are referred to [16] .
Definition 2.1 (trapdoor hash family [2] In the following subsections, we first review Krawczyk and Rabin's DL-based trapdoor hash family. We then review Shamir and Tauman's factoring-based trapdoor hash family.
Krawczyk and Rabin's DL-based trapdoor hash family
Krawczyk and Rabin [3] 
Shamir and Tauman's factoring-based trapdoor hash family
Shamir and Tauman [2] described the trapdoor hash function in H based on factoring assumption as follows. Randomly choose two safe primes p and q (i.e. primes such that p = (p − 1)/2 and q = (q − 1)/2 are primes) and compute n = pq. Randomly choose an element g of order λ(n), where λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = 2p q . The public hash key is HK = (n, g) and the private trapdoor key is TK = (p, q). The trapdoor hash function h HK (m, s) is defined as follows:
where ' ' denotes concatenation. A lemma and its formal proof asserting that h HK (m, s) is a factoring-based trapdoor hash family can be found in [2] .
OUR MULTIPLE-COLLISION TRAPDOOR HASH FAMILIES
In Krawczyk and Rabin's DL-based trapdoor hash family, reviewed in Section 2.1, there is only one secret element in TK, i.e. x. Therefore, there is only one associated public value y in HK. Shamir and Tauman [2] utilized this trapdoor hash family to construct a one-time on-line/off-line signature scheme (see Section 4.2 for the reason why their signature is one-time).
To efficiently use a trapdoor hash value for signing multiple messages, we propose to include an additional one-time secret in the trapdoor hash function. This is similar to ElGamal's signature scheme [15] in which a one-time secret key was introduced for signing each message. That is, we introduce a new parameter r for our proposed trapdoor hash function, and denote h HK (m, r, s) as a trapdoor hash function in H. In Section 5.1, we will use our modified trapdoor hash families in an on-line/off-line signature scheme so that a signer can use the same trapdoor hash value to sign multiple messages.
In the following subsections, we first introduce a new trapdoor hash family based on the DL assumption, and then introduce a new trapdoor hash family based on the Factoring assumption. In both cases, we also present formal security proofs of our proposed trapdoor hash families.
DL-based multiple-collision trapdoor hash family
The original ElGamal signature scheme [15] was proposed in 1985; but its security was never proved equivalent to the DL problem. In 1996, Pointcheval and Stern [17] used the Forking Lemma to prove the security of a slight variant of the original ElGamal signature scheme, called modified ElGamal signature scheme. Later in this section, we shall show that the modified ElGamal signature scheme is a special function of our proposed trapdoor hash function. In this section, we first review the modified ElGamal signature scheme. We then introduce a new trapdoor hash family based on the DL and present a formal security proof of our proposed scheme.
Modified ElGamal signature scheme consists of three steps as follows:
• Let p be a random large prime and g be a generator of Z * p ; then the public key is y = g x (mod p) and the secret key is x.
• Picks k ∈ Z p−1 randomly and a cryptographic hash function f , the signature of message m is (r, s), where The following paragraph describes the DL-based multiplecollision trapdoor hash function. Choose at random a safe prime p (i.e. a prime p such that q = (p − 1)/2 is prime) and an element g of order q. Choose random elements x, k, s ∈ Z q , and compute y = g x (mod p) and r = g k (mod p). The public hash key is HK = (p, g, y) and the private trapdoor key is TK = (x, k). The randomized hash function in H is defined as follows: 
Remark 2.
There are three reasons why we use function f to hash message m and commitment r: (1) Efficiencyfor any message with an arbitrary length, the length of the output of function f is fixed, (2) Security-similar to using function f in any digital signature scheme to prevent existential forgery, our proposed trapdoor hash function can easily and effectively prevent collisions when using the hash function f , (3) Security proof-we assume that hash function f behaves like a random oracle, and hence we follow the established cryptographic techniques, i.e. the Oracle Replay Attack and the Forking Lemma as proposed in [17] , to prove the collision resistance of our proposed trapdoor hash family.
Remark 3.
Later in this paper we shall show that the auxiliary number r must not be re-used in signing more than one message. Since r = g k , where k is a random value from Z q , it is probabilistically negligible to select the same k for different messages. Proof. We show that the new trapdoor hash family based on the DL satisfies the three properties: efficiency, trapdoor collision and collision resistance. Since the user knows the trapdoor secret (x, k) and can also compute r = g k ( mod p), where k is randomly selected from Z q , the value of s can be calculated in polynomial time as follows:
Collision Resistance: For a formal security proof, the hash function f = f (m, r) in our proposed trapdoor hash function will be treated as a random oracle. 
(mod p).
Thus, we have r
Since s 2 − s 1 = 0, it is easy to compute the DL of r 1 as
Repeating the same procedure from the beginning, the adversary can generate a second collision (m 2 , f 2 , r 2 , s 2 ) such that
2 (mod p), where m 1 = m 2 and r 1 = r 2 . The adversary can also compute the DL of r 2 . We assume that the DL of r 1 and r 2 are k 1 and k 2 , respectively. Then, the adversary can establish the following equation as
The adversary can solve the DL of y as
) (mod q).
This result contradicts the DL assumption.
Factoring-based multiple-collision trapdoor hash family
This section describes another new trapdoor hash function in H based on factoring assumption. Choose at random two safe primes p and q (i.e. primes such that p = (p − 1)/2 and q = (q − 1)/2 are primes) and compute n = pq. Choose at random an element g of order λ(n), where λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = 2p q . Choose a random element k and compute r = g k (mod n). The public hash key HK = (n, g) and the private trapdoor key TK = (p, q, k) . The randomized hash function in H is defined as follows:
where f : {0, 1} * → Z λ(n) is a cryptographic hash function.
Theorem 3.2. The pair (I, H) is a trapdoor hash family under the factoring assumption.
Proof. We show that the proposed trapdoor hash family based on factoring assumption satisfies the three properties: efficiency, trapdoor collision and collision resistance.
Efficiency: Given any tuple (m, r, s) and the public hash key (n, g), the hash value h HK (m, r, s) = rg f (m,r)s ( mod n) can be computed in polynomial time.
Trapdoor Collision: The following shows that calculating the trapdoor collision (m , r , s ) by the user with the knowledge of trapdoor secret TK = (p, q, k) can be done in polynomial time. Given (m, r, s) and additional m and r , where r = g k (mod n), the user wants to find s such that
Since the user knows the trapdoor secret (p, q, k) and can compute r = g k (mod n), where k is randomly selected, the value of s can be calculated in polynomial time as follows:
Collision Resistance: For a formal security proof, the hash function f = f (m, r) in our proposed trapdoor hash function will be treated as a random oracle. Assume to the contrary that without knowing the trapdoor secret (p, q, k), given input HK = (n, g), the adversary can generate a collision r 1 ) , by making some oracle queries in probabilistic polynomial time. Then, based on the well-known cryptographic techniques, the Oracle Replay Attack and the Forking Lemma as proposed in [17] , the adversary uses the oracle replay attack by a polynomial replay of the attack with the same random tape and a different oracle. The adversary obtains two collisions of a special form as (m 1 , f 1 , r 1 , s 1 ) and (m 2 , f 2 , r 2 , s 2 ) , where (m 1 , r 1 ) = (m 2 , r 2 ), f 1 = f 2 and s 1 = s 2 .
Since (f 1 , r 1 , s 1 ) and (f 2 , r 1 , s 2 ) are collisions for H , we get the following two equations:
Thus, we have g k 1 +f 1 s 1 = g k 1 +f 2 s 2 ( mod n) and set x = f 1 s 1 − f 2 s 2 . Since f 1 = f 2 and s 1 = s 2 , the probability that x = 0 is negligible. Therefore, λ(n) divides x. Thus, φ(n) divides 2x. In essence, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm such that given input HK, it outputs a multiple of φ(n). In [18] , Miller shows that the factorization of n can be computed from any multiple of φ(n). Therefore, this contradicts the factoring assumption.
REVIEW OF SHAMIR AND TAUMAN'S SCHEME
In [2] , Shamir and Tauman introduced a Hash-Sign-Switch paradigm in which any regular digital signature scheme (such as DSA [19] or RSA [20] ) combined with a trapdoor hash family in (I, H) can be converted into a on-line/off-line signature scheme. Basically, in the off-line phase, a signer generates a hash value to commit to an arbitrarily selected message. In the on-line phase, given a message, the signer finds a collision of the trapdoor hash to the previously calculated hash value. The collision point and the signature generated in the off-line phase can be used as the signature for message generated in the on-line phase. In Shamir and Tauman's efficiency analysis [2] , they showed that their scheme is efficient in that the computational load in the on-line phase is about 0.1 modular multiplication, and the signature size increases only by a factor of two, instead of a quadratic factor as in the approach of Even et al. [1] .
In Section 4.1, we describe Shamir and Tauman's on-line/offline signature scheme in details. Section 4.2 describes an issue associated with their approach.
Approach
Shamir and Tauman's approach can combine any trapdoor hash family (I, H) and any regular digital signature scheme (GEN, SIGN, VERF) to generate an on-line/off-line signature scheme (GEN , SIGN , VERF ) . The following gives an example of a signature scheme where the trapdoor hash family is based on the DL assumption.
Let h HK (m, s) = g m y s (mod p), where HK = (y, g, p), TK = x, y = g x (mod p), p is a safe prime, g is a generator of order q and q is a factor of p − 1. Denote a verification key by VK and a signing key by SK for any regular digital signature scheme.
• The Key Generation Algorithm GEN : Generate (SK, VK) using a key generation algorithm GEN and a pair (TK, HK) using algorithm I. The signing key is (SK, TK, HK) and the verification key is (VK, HK).
• The Signing Algorithm SIGN : Given a signing key (SK, TK, HK), the signing algorithm operates as follows.
• HK (m, s) ). The signer stores m, s, and SIGN SK (h HK (m, s) ).
• On-line phase: Given a message m , the signer finds a collision of the trapdoor hash such that h HK (m , s ) = h HK (m, s) by solving s such that it satisfies m + xs = m + xs (mod q). The signature of message m is SIGN SK (h HK (m, s) ), s .
• • The Key Generation Algorithm GEN : Generate a pair (SK, VK) using a key generation algorithm GEN and a pair (TK, HK) using algorithm I. The signing key is (SK, TK, HK) and the verification key is (VK, HK).
• The Signing Algorithm SIGN : We now analyze the security of the proposed on-line/off-line signature scheme. Our scheme is obtained using the general conversion technique as Shamir and Tauman's scheme [2] . Thus, we can easily get the following result (Theorem 5.1) for our scheme. Since the proof of this theorem is similar to the Shamir and Tanman's scheme, we omit the detailed description of the proof. 
Modified on-line/off-line signature scheme
Our trapdoor hash value can be used for signing multiple messages. Thus, it can be included in a regular digital certificate to provide its authenticity. In essence, our proposed on-line/offline signature scheme does not need any regular digital signature scheme to sign a hash value in the off-line phase. As we have pointed out in remark 1 that the modified ElGamal signature is a special function of our proposed trapdoor hash family, the modified ElGamal signature does not need any regular digital signature scheme to sign its hash value in the off-line phase. Based on this observation, we give a modified version for our scheme.
We now present the modified on-line/off-line signature scheme (GEN, SIGN, VERF) based on the multiple-collision trapdoor hash families (I, H) described in Section 3 as follows.
• = h HK (m, r, s).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, multiple-collision trapdoor hash families under both DL and factoring assumptions are introduced and are secure under the random oracle model. We propose an efficient on-line/off-line signature scheme based on these multiplecollision trapdoor hash families. In our proposed scheme, as a trapdoor hash value can be used for signing multiple messages, the hash value can be included in the signer's public-key digital certificate for long-term use, thereby eliminating the need for a regular digital signature for each message, signing in the offline phase of Shamir and Tauman's on-line/off-line signature scheme.
